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This paper describes the idiosyncracies of a case study company, through highlighting issues and problems
experienced during their attempts to evaluate, implement and realise the holistic implications of a manufac-
turing information system. Although the Information System (IS) was operational for a period of time, it
was eventually deemed a failure. The reason for this was that a range of human and organisational factors
prevented the organisation from embracing the full impact of the system. The eventual success of their
information system was realised through a bespoke implementation, based upon a traditional systems devel-
opment lifecycle that indirectly addressed learning issues following the earlier failed deployment. The
paper highlights key issues relating to business success and failure, and then contrasts them alongside the
presented case study. In doing so, the authors conclude by proposing methods through which manufacturing
information systems can be transformed for business success. This is described achievable through both a
realisation in the positioning of the organisation relative to technology management, and the related map-
ping of human and technological constructs that support information systems related success. European
Journal of Information Systems (2001) 10, 55–66.
Introduction
The normative literature regards innovative strategies as
being reliant upon creative thinking and management,
together with the ability to plan/react to customer-related
change. Such are considered key enablers for organisational
growth and success. Organisations that focus on technology
are particularly prone to encountering change rapidly. Car-
rier (1999) points out, that the management of such firms
is becoming increasingly reliant upon managing either dis-
ruptive technology (technology that replaces processes) or
creative technology (technology that enhances processes).
Clearly, this can cause a dichotomy in how organisations
operate and embrace IT-enabled change.
To overcome such obstacles, Brown and Eisenhardt
(1998) suggest that organisations should develop com-
petitive strategies that focus on:
I thriving on uncertainty;
I discovery and reinvention;
I maintenance of a broad vision;
I market realignment;
I creative thought and requirement satisfaction;
I realignment of disruptive to creative technology; and
I the planning for learning (plan for failure).
Tuval (1999) highlights similar issues, but, suggests
organisations target key stakeholders within the
enterprise, as well as their customers. In doing so, realis-
ing the potential for change within the expectation of
each stakeholder, together with establishing how such
expectations can be leveraged through organisational
change. Hence, stakeholder power and influence need to
be seen as highly important Critical Success Factors
(CSF) that will continue to drive improvements in struc-
ture, culture and process (Rockart, 1979; Mercer, 1999).
All of these issues seek to sustain the organisation’s
capability to learn and adapt to problems as they arise,
thus establishing a method to operationalise the funda-
mental characteristics of a learning organisation
(KPMG, 1996).
In order to draw on the issues of IT-enabled change
and its contribution towards transformation, a case study
is used to gain an understanding about why and how a
small–medium-sized manufacturing enterprise (known
as Company V) learned from failure with respect to the
implementation of an information system.
The case study adopted a vendor-based Manufacturing
Resource Planning (MRPII) information system (Wight,
1984), which subsequently failed to satisfy the require-
ments of its internal stakeholders.
The reason for this failure is attributed to not consider-
ing human and organisational factors during the evalu-
ation and implementation process. However, in later
realising the importance of such issues, the company
sought to address what later became regarded as con-
structs for success, through undertaking a process of
bespoke information system development.
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Such constructs for success have been extrapolated
from the case study, and are presented within technology
management taxonomies. In doing so, this allows others
to draw parallels through providing a validated ‘frame
of reference’. The organisation’s experiences, in solving
the problems associated with the implementation of their
information system, provide a learning opportunity for
those companies that are seeking a competitive advan-
tage through technology management.
Information systems failure
Despite the substantial financial commitment budgeted
to the information systems function, many companies
continue to express their discontent with the perform-
ance of their information systems. In support of this,
Hochstrasser and Griffiths (1991) report that 70% of IS
projects fail to deliver the benefits sought, and in many
cases, provide no measurable gains at all.
Although information systems failure is regarded as
widespread, there remains no common frame of refer-
ence regarding the constituent components of a failure,
with Keil (1994) contending that the definition of failure
depends on whom you ask. Consequently, the literature
is somewhat vague on the actual percentage of projects
that fail. DeMarco (1982) suggests that there is a 15%
failure rate with IS projects, although this would appear
somewhat optimistic, as Lyytinen and Hirschheim
(1987) and then Crescenzi (1989) report failure rates of
60% and 85% respectively. More recently, Phan et al
(1995) presented the results of a survey that showed 25%
of the 143 projects surveyed did not meet user require-
ments. In the same year, Johnson (1995) reported survey
results that showed from a sample of 365 companies,
31% were cancelled before completion, and 53% over-
ran, with overrun costs and budget impairing func-
tionality. Consequently, the claim made by Remenyi
(1991) that there are as many failed information systems
implementations as there are successful ones appears to
remain valid. However, failed systems are costly, not
only for hardware and software but, also in human and
organisational terms (Irani & Love, 2000). However, in
trying to learn from past failures, Willcocks and Marg-
etts (1994) suggest that project planning estimates and
management tend to improve with greater information
systems experience.
In spite of disappointments in information system
investments, successful deployments can bring many
advantages that include enhanced efficiency and effec-
tiveness through business process transformation.
Willcocks (1994) points out that successful users of
information systems are those that:
I continuously measure and control their systems
effectiveness, possibly a result of their learning
experiences of being able to identify where project
implications arise; and,
I appropriately manage contentious human and organ-
isational factors.
Company experience: learning opportunity
The case study presented is used to describe a company’s
experiences in addressing the problems associated with
adopting a manufacturing information system. The paper
offers a learning opportunity for other Small/Medium
Enterprises (SME) that are using information systems to
support IT-enabled business transformational change.
Research methodology
Previous research suggests that an organisation’s failure
with information systems is primarily attributable to not
meeting user expectations, which underlines the signifi-
cance of the soft human and organisational issues
involved with information systems (Irani & Love, 2000;
Khalifa et al, 2000). Consequently, there was a need for
a methodology that would involve and enfranchise an
organisation and their staff so that knowledge about
information systems evaluation and implementation
could be derived to develop technology management
taxonomies, thus supporting organisational self-evalu-
ation. Considering the originality of this research a case
study approach was adopted (Bonoma, 1985; Hakim,
1987; Yin, 1994; Irani et al, 1999). The case study
described through this research was not systematically
sampled, therefore, it is not possible to generalise the
findings to a wider population of SMEs with similar
characteristics within the manufacturing industry. Ana-
lytical generalisations are however drawn and tech-
nology management taxonomies for evaluation are
propagated for use by other SMEs in the manufactur-
ing industry.
Data collection and analysis
A fieldwork case study can be used to collect both quan-
titative and qualitative data, although the research
methods employed during this investigation were quali-
tative. Structured interviews were used as the primary
research instrument with data being triangulated through
interviews and discussions with senior management and
shop-floor employees.
Senior management were formally interviewed with a
semi-structured interview agenda being used to navigate
and guide the interview process. More informal methods
were used to elicit data from shop floor employees.
These methods of data gathering were justified as they
allowed the researcher to ask standardised questions of
the interviewee, and ‘steer’ the interview process. All
interviews were tape recorded and later transcribed.
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Evaluation process
The success of Company V’s previous information sys-
tem investments helped to give them encouragement and
motivation, which they needed to introduce a com-
puterized Production Planning and Control (PPC) infor-
mation system (the genesis of MRPII). However, unlike
other ‘smaller’ investments, the driving force behind this
project was from the Managing Director (MD), who
sanctioned all investment decisions. When asked to
evaluate the perceived impact of the proposed PPC sys-
tem, the MD replied:
The scope of benefits from investing in information technology
appeared enormous, . . . only been restricted by my imagin-
ation. I was the main visionary leader and could see the long-
term strategic implications of my decision to invest. . . . I was
sure the benefits would far outweigh the costs.
However, there appeared to be other factors ‘driving’
this investment, with the MD saying:
We were under significant pressure by our customers to
offer year on year cost reductions . . . so there were risks
associated with not utilising new technology to provide a
competitive advantage.
Company V lacked a robust evaluation system, which
would appear to be rooted in their lack of previous
investment appraisal in projects that could not be
appraised using traditional techniques, a taxonomy of
which is offered by Irani et al (1997). The adoption of
MRPII initially presented the company with a dilemma.
In particular, strategic benefits such as: perceived market
leadership, leader in new technology, promotion of an
open culture, etc, albeit extremely important for the
growth and survival of the firm, were not readily con-
vertible into cash values. Consequently, traditional
appraisal techniques proved inadequate for the changing
nature of benefits resulting from Company V’s capital
expenditure.
Previous investments in Numerically Controlled
(NC)/Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) equip-
ment had been financed through loan agreements, where
cash flow projections and sensitivity analysis had been
used to assess the financial impact and risk of the invest-
ment. However, Company V soon discovered that such
accountancy frameworks were not suitable for invest-
ments with intangible and non-financial benefits, there-
fore proving inappropriate for the evaluation of their pro-
posed information system.
These issues, together with a new and inexperienced
management team, unaware of strategic and integrated
appraisal techniques that could acknowledge, albeit sub-
jectively, qualitative costs and benefits, resulted in a
simplistic Cost/Benefit Analysis (CBA) being used.
Management’s use of CBA, allowed the listing of per-
ceived project benefits and costs, however, no assign-
ments of financial values were made to those factors
identified. The reason for this was due to the complexity,
subjectivity and time-consuming nature of identifying
and assigning arbitrary values to the intangible and non-
financial benefits. Although the appraisal method used
was subjective and judgemental, Company V employed
much time and effort into identifying the range of bene-
fits associated with the proposed investment. The tax-
onomy of benefits identified as part of Company V’s
CBA can be seen in Figure 1.
This taxonomy has been categorised into three: stra-
tegic, tactical, and operational. Regarding the costs con-
sidered as part of Company V’s CBA, they only ident-
ified direct financial costs, such as those presented by
Irani et al (1997; 1998). Hence, as Company V was
unable to accurately calculate the financial returns achi-
evable, an ‘act of faith’ decision to invest in their MRPII
system was made by senior management. Interestingly
enough, the British Chartered Institute of Management
Accountants/Institute of Production Engineers (British
CIMA/IProdE, 1987), have suggested that some benefits
of information systems cannot be quantified, and state
that ‘investing. . .as an act of faith on such systems, may
be required’. Therefore, the British CIMA/IProdE
appears to advocate the justification strategy adopted by
Company V. However, Kaplan (1985) explains that if
companies, even for good strategic reasons, consistently
invest in projects whose financial returns are unknown,
or below their cost of capital, they will inevitably begin
to approach insolvency. Therefore the authors suggest
that much care needs to be taken during the evaluation
of information systems.
Figure 1 The taxonomy of strategic, tactical and operational benefits.
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Vendor package implementation
Software selection and development
The core PPC software module bought and installed was
the Production Control and Scheduling (PCS) function.
Additional functions were also considered by the system
selection and implementation team at the company but later
rejected. The basis for their decision to reject these
additional modules centred on poor user interface, high
cost, repetitive data entry and perceived poor effectiveness
in the planning and controlling of jobbing shop production.
The system selection and implementation team did
however identify a need for a tool management module,
which was later purchased from a secondary software
vendor. During the implementation of the core PCS
module, it became evident that the vendor-supplied
software system required the user to fulfil the ‘needs’
of the module, hindering the effective representation of
Company V’s data. As such, issues involved with the
redesigning of business processes (such as these) were
sought to be avoided, thus limiting further expense, time
and disruptions to production performance. Furthermore,
these implications appeared as significant cost factors
that had not been acknowledged within their previous
CBA. Nonetheless, the redesign of processes presented
themselves to Company V as unavoidable, to achieve
the necessary functionality for the effective use of the
PCS module.
For numerous other reasons (human and
organisational), the introduction of the information sys-
tem proved more difficult than anticipated. For the first
time, Company V had disciplines, controls and pro-
cedures, with their information system producing route
cards and operational planning. Clearly, supporting tra-
ceability that the company sought as a competitive
advantage in light of quality standards such as British
Standard 5750, the organisation was dependent on accur-
ate reliable data being generated to produce information
for management.
Employee resistance towards computerised infor-
mation systems proved to be a contributing factor
towards the complexity of implementation. People
openly blamed the information system when things went
wrong. The production director was regularly confronted
with ‘work to lists’ that had enormous amounts of seem-
ingly meaningless data, and was ready to dismiss the
system and go back to the old manual way of PPC. Yet,
the software selection and implementation team man-
aged to convince the production director that com-
puterised PPC was the only way forward. The team
explained that the difficulties being experienced could
be attributable to the lack of a suitable reporting structure
and data format. Furthermore, they explained that the
system needed time to ‘settle down’, and was the only
way forward if the company’s expansion plans for
growth based on efficient and effective IT-enabled busi-
ness processes were to be achieved.
Company V’s biggest problem was with their vendor
PCS module, which only worked efficiently if supplied
with a continuous flow of ‘clean’ data. However, if there
were any ‘hitches’ in data recording, or accuracy, then
the system became highly unstable. Therefore, the need
to alleviate this problem led the selection and implemen-
tation team to investigate the purchase of a vendor Shop
Floor Data Collection (SFDC) module as a ‘plug-in’.
Further benefits resulting from such an investment were
considered to include improvements in the accuracy with
which PPC resource decisions could be made by man-
agement and empowered employees. Moreover, the pur-
chase of the SFDC module seemed a natural progression
towards achieving ‘full’ MRPII (intra-organisational)
information system integration.
Human and organisational issues
In hindsight, the software selection and implementation
team regretted not educating the workforce on the oper-
ational need for PPC. Furthermore, management attri-
buted this lack of education and training towards the sys-
tem not receiving the operational support necessary for
its successful implementation and operation, for
example, resulting in unreliable data reflected in the
form of ‘noise’ in the Master Production Schedule
(MPS). The consequence of ‘noise’ in the MPS led to
additional operational costs, decreases in productivity,
and loss of customer base following inaccurate delivery
lead-times being quoted. All these factors had a signifi-
cant impact on the perceived success of the SFDC mod-
ule, and were not acknowledged as implementation
issues during the evaluation process.
It was at this point that the MD, who was considered
to be the project champion, turned his attention to a new
project, appearing to have either lost interest, due to the
lack of success, or been ‘driven’ by other organisational
improvement initiatives. Responsibility of the
implementation process was delegated to others, and it
was envisaged that the well-established production
director would take up the challenge. Interestingly, the
production director was not a key member of the
software selection and implementation team, but instead
operated as an honoree, and on occasion simply advised
on technical issues but only when consulted. The pro-
duction director was therefore expected to take the lead
in his role as head of the production department. This
new responsibility for ensuring project success of a
‘half’ implemented information system, for which little
consultation with the production director had been
sought, was not readily welcomed. However, the pro-
duction director did acknowledge the contribution the
PPC system was making/could further make towards the
streamlining of the production function by stating:
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It was never my project. No one wanted to involve me. . .So
I didn’t want to get involved in it (the production planning
and control system), even more so, when it was proving not
to deliver the benefits sought.
It is clear that the focus of the software selection and
implementation team suddenly changed, from one of
great expectation, to a process of blame apportioning,
which is described by Barker (1998). Many of the prob-
lems that ‘real-time’ shop floor data collection were
intended to alleviate appeared to further complicate this
technology. The production director, in his defence,
claimed that the failure of the SFDC module was
because:
We had not sat down in the first place and formalised our
systems. . .People were not informed of the impact the sys-
tem would make on their job function(s). . .nobody on the
shop floor bought into ensuring the success of the
system. . .They needed educating.
Identifying failure within the implementation process
It appeared that at this point in the implementation pro-
cess, the software selection and implementation team
reached a ‘stalemate’. No clear direction could be
decided, as there was no focused leadership within the
team. Furthermore, the PPC software appeared to be dic-
tating the need for specialised functions, such as data
analysis and manipulation, and control of the production
function. This was not welcomed by the majority of the
management team, who were trying to develop a corpor-
ate culture based on openness, through promoting the
concepts of flexible, empowered teamwork.
The adoption of the information system did not have
the operational support necessary for its successful use.
As a result, management, who were supported by the
software selection and implementation team, advocated
the development of a bespoke system that was con-
sidered more suited to the perceived idiosyncracies of
the company’s business processes, together with their
perceived unique needs as a subcontract jobbing shop.
Longenecker et al (1999) offers a contrast on failing
to achieve information systems implementation, with
Table 1 culminating research with that extrapolated from
Company V.
The interpretation of Table 1 would appear to support
the argument that the appropriate management of intan-
gible, qualitative, people-focussed factors can be used as
enablers for success or failure. Hence, as such, the
empirical findings support the argument that new tech-
nology alone does not imply business success but relies
heavily on the input of vested stakeholders.
Bespoke development of an information
system1
Driven by the need to develop an ‘integrated’ infor-
mation system that would acknowledge the idiosyncra-
Table 1 Aspects of business failure and success within Com-
pany V
Issues found in Company V Constructs Constructs
for failure for success
Bilateral communication 4
Planning 4
‘Voice’ for front-line managers 4
Direction and planning 4
Management development 4
Motivation 4
Culture and feedback 4
Operating structure 4
Cashflow 4
Workforce-management conflicts 4
Communication 4 4
Improvement of leadership 4
Training and motivation 4
Application of corrective action 4
Clear goal definition 4
Change management 4
Goal conflict 4
Teamwork 4
Customer service 4
Empowering managers 4
Performance indicators 4
Total quality management 4
Resources 4
Organisational learning 4
Product development 4
Stakeholder support 4
Technology management 4
Standards and regulations 4
Source: Adapted from Longenecker et al (1999).
cies of Company V, the firm set about developing their
‘own’ business solution. The previously formed software
selection and implementation team took the initiative
and developed a business case for a bespoke infor-
mation system.
The company believed that it would be more satisfied
with the results of their ‘own’ system, rather than the
on-going implementation of what was increasingly
becoming a ‘rigid’ vendor system. The development of
bespoke software was perceived to give Company V a
‘new’ opportunity to gain operational support that was
considered necessary for success. Hence, it would appear
that human and organisational issues played a crucial
part in this decision making process.
The decision by Company V to develop its ‘own’
software was seen as a significant turnaround by many
within the organisation, and indeed contradicted the MD’s
initial justification for purchasing vendor software. The
scope of costs associated with developing a bespoke infor-
mation system was considered greater than those detailed
during the original CBA. Therefore, as part of a revised
CBA, Company V identified a new dimension of costs
that it perceived would be incurred during the develop-
ment, implementation and operation of a bespoke infor-
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Figure 2 Taxonomy of indirect organisational costs.
mation system. These new costs were considered
additional to the already realised direct costs that had been
incurred during the earlier purchase of vendor software.
Figures 2 and 3 present taxonomies that have been classi-
fied as indirect organisational and human costs.
Incidentally, the majority of benefits originally envis-
aged as deliverables from implementing vendor software
appeared to have still remained relevant. Acknowledging
that the vendor SFDC system had significant problems
and as such, failed to realise expectation, Company V
decided to abandon its use. This decision was justified by:
I poor data reliability;
I network interface problems;
I swipe hardware terminal problems;
I lack of employee support and discipline to use con-
sistently the bar code system;
I lack of interest to continue the implementation
process;
Figure 3 Taxonomy of indirect human costs.
I manipulation of system (staff failing to use the sys-
tem; staff falsifying records);
I misalignment between the strategic direction of the
vendor and the organisation;
I falls in productivity; and
I lack of clear project focus, leadership and deliver-
ables.
It was decided by the MD to enlist the support of a
consultant, as help was needed to facilitate the design,
development and implementation of the bespoke infor-
mation system.
However, before such processes commenced, Company
V re-assessed its strategic direction, strengths and weak-
nesses, and revised its business plan together with
developing a project strategy and plan. Company V then
began a series of intensive education sessions with man-
agers, as well as workshop training days with operational
employees. All functional managers were educated on the
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importance of an integrated manufacturing information
system, and on the impact that the investment would make
to their job function(s). A simplified concept justification
course was developed and delivered to shopfloor stake-
holders. This course not only addressed the educational
issues associated with a manufacturing information sys-
tem but also looked at the practical implications of such
a system on individual job function(s). The subject and
teaching media used varied, using as much imagination
as possible. Teamwork was promoted with all employees
being mixed and grouped together. They were filmed and
reviewed playing ‘fun to learn’ games, using ‘Lego’ and
‘jigsaws’, all with meaning for throughput production
flow, communication, Just in Time (JIT), inventory man-
agement and Total Quality Management (TQM). The
workshop exercises appeared to be well received and
helped to ‘win over’ sceptics. In parallel with the work-
shop training and education sessions, a system design and
development team was assembled. Where necessary, new
employees (subject to their acceptance) were sent on
external training courses to develop new skills (technical).
In addition, further resources were employed, usually in
the form of software engineers, who were students on
industrial placements2.
This type of recruitment policy helped to keep system
development costs down, thus reducing the need for
expensive contract engineers who were considered out
of the financial reach of an SME. Furthermore, the legal-
ities of employing new resources were avoided, as the
students were on fixed term contracts. An additional
benefit of having software engineering, information sys-
tems and computer science students on the project was
to maintain a constant ‘stream’ of innovation, inspiration
and motivation. However, much management and con-
trol was necessary to retain project focus. During the
development of the bespoke information system, Com-
pany V schematically mapped out its entire business pro-
cesses using static business process design tools (Irani
et al, 2000). This allowed the redesign of business pro-
cesses, and facilitated the removal of ‘non-value adding’
activities. This approach to business transformation was
considerably different from earlier attempts, in that pre-
vious process redesign efforts appeared to be generic,
and were based around the functionality of the vendor
supplied software.
The re-engineering of business processes before
bespoke system development allowed for the software
being developed to be modeled on ‘best practice’ jobbing
shop processes. It was at this point that the expertise of
the consultant and academic institutions that supported the
placement students proved invaluable. In essence, Com-
pany V’s business transformation was built on the con-
structs of ‘best practice’, together with a review of those
features available in ‘off the shelf’ packages.
Organisational and technological business
transformation: a functional model
The ‘5M’ Model
The case study findings have identified a number of tech-
nology management factors as having an impact on the
failure/success of Company V’s information system
implementation and subsequent business transformation.
These factors are presented in Table 2, where their con-
tribution towards the implementation of vendor software
and later development of a bespoke system is identified.
Figure 4 presents a validated model of technology
management integration constructs extrapolated from the
case study.
The authors of the ‘5M’ model, which also comp-
lements the four-stage information technology strategy
of Ho (1996), now present these factors. This approach
details the primary issues that enable the organisational,
strategic and operational aspects of an integrated manu-
facturing enterprise solution. Each factor in turn consti-
tutes those aspects of the business that are required to
support business transformation. Hence, the 5M model
can complement performance metrics available to man-
agement. This, in turn, may also be realised through con-
ducting a balanced scorecard approach.
Material
This facet essentially describes the flow of information
packets within the organisation, and the management of
mission-critical information (in terms of data, process
and knowledge). This can be achieved through the adop-
tion of an open information system, and may be sup-
ported by a consistent reporting scheme and docu-
mentation format ie the generation of an MPS that details
appropriate information, such as customer delivery dates,
material availability, capacity, schedules etc.
Man
To realise the full benefit of combining each of these
issues together, human and organisational resources
should be carefully planned and matched against techno-
logical implications. To enable this, it is essential to tar-
get the right people to be trained and educated, and for
the required level of training resources to be available
to them. The culture and management mix of the organ-
isation should also endeavour to encourage goal-
focussed aptitude to be an inherent characteristic of
each project.
Within Company V, there is an organisational belief
that 20% of the workforce should be capable of ‘high’
precision manufacture, with the remaining 80% capable
of ‘general’ sub-contract jobbing shop work. The impli-
cations for this are far reaching in terms of human and
organisational benefits and costs.
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Table 2 Comparative review of technology management processes
Technology management factors Vendor software Bespoke software
Investment strategy Act of faith Act of faith
Formal project management No project management techniques Project manager, Gantt charts, procedures
Company culture Closed and reactive Open and proactive
Concept justification to workforce No discussion/workforce Discussion with workforce on the importance
involvement of MRPII
Workforce educated and trained No training/education on IT/MRPII Workforce educated about MPRII and IT
trained
Management educated and trained Only project team managers All organisational managers trained and
trained and educated about educated about IT/MRPII
IT/MRPII
Appraisal technique Cost/benefit analysis Cost/benefit analysis
Consultancy support No external involvement Consultancy facilitation
Academic involvement No university involvement University industrial placement students
Continuous project evaluation No periodic review of project Monthly management review meetings
Investment integrated into business plan Investment seen in isolation to Investment integrated into strategic, tactical
business objectives and operation business objectives
Classification of benefits identified Strategic, tactical and operational Strategic, tactical and operational
Nature of benefits identified Financial, non-financial and Financial, non-financial and intangible
intangible
Classification of costs identified Direct costs Direct/indirect costs (human and
organisational)
Nature of costs identified Financial Financial and intangible
Risk considered Competitive risk Competitive risk
Perceived project outcome Failure Success
Figure 4 The ‘5M’ evaluation model.
Machine
The introduction and adoption of new resources, such
as information systems, are necessary requirements to
maintain competitive advantage, and achieve medium
and long-term strategic goals. Investment in appropriate
hardware and software is important and issues of inte-
gration with proprietary systems, obsolescence and up-
gradeability should be taken into account when evaluat-
ing such technologies. Internal competencies and a posi-
tive cultural atmosphere are significant external factors
outside the traditional information systems evaluation
process. As such, they have the potential to hinder this
process (Braglia & Petroni, 1999).
Money
Money, or capital expenditure, is the most important fac-
tor when considering investing in new technology. The
reason for this is that no matter how necessary the tech-
nology, if finances do not support its adoption, its justi-
fication becomes futile. The implementation of techno-
logies should focus on a long-term commitment from
which tactical and strategic benefits can be gained for
the organisation. Therefore, judicious and accurate mod-
elling of cash flows is required, wherein indirect costs
which need to be considered during the capital budgeting
process are considered. Similarly, prudence needs to be
exercised when considering strategic and tactical bene-
fits, as operational survival needs to be realised to sup-
port medium and long-term growth and success.
Method
Methods to harness and realise those factors that support
successful integration within business processes have to
be achieved (ie through structured evaluations). The
development of the decision-making process beyond tra-
ditionally myopic financial accounting procedures, is a
significant step in this direction. Amongst others, those
non-economic appraisal techniques identified by Irani et
al (1997; 1998) may be considered in this light.
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By considering qualitative project implications during
the justification process, the wider implications of infor-
mation, knowledge, human and non-human resources
can be put into context.
The Capability Maturity Model (CMM) as described
by Paulk et al (1993) has been the genesis for many
such transformation approaches, particularly in software
engineering. This has been the basis for other cultural
management models, such as that proposed by Dale
(1993), together with the recent subjective approach of
S3’s software process improvement project (Kelly &
Culleton, 1999). However, Carrier (1999) warns against
the usage of these process maturity models as a purely
methodology-driven business ‘quick fix’. Indeed, Burnes
(1998) agrees with this view also, stating that change
need not always be prescriptive, but a combination of
changes ‘choices’, in order to provide stability and focus.
The need for continuous business transformation
The authors believe, however, that the basis of any fore-
casted integration lies clearly at the feet of a lifecycle
methodology, which will involve many different aspects
of an organisation. Hence, this case study would appear
to support the normative literature in its view that ‘to
holistically evaluate information system projects, there
is a need to involve team members from each functional
group in the assessment, implementation and evaluation
of an adopted technology’. This involves listening to
employees’ comments and embracing change and new
ideas through the mechanism of a project management
lifecycle model (aspects of which are embedded within
the 5 M model). Furthermore, external evaluators should
also carry out post-implementation evaluation so that an
independent perspective on the project deliverables can
be obtained and then integrated into the learning of
the organisation.
Table 3 defines those factors that have been identified
in the 5M model arising out of the case study research
presented. This table shows the impact of each ‘M’ fac-
tor on these aspects of the information system in Com-
pany V. This matrix defines failure and success of the
information system in the case study, and can be used
by others as a frame of reference for defining the busi-
ness fit of manufacturing information systems.
Table 3 Business transformation factors mapped to the 5M model
Factor Material Man Machine Money Method
Re-engineering 4 4 4 4 4
Education and training 4 4 4 4
Information management 4 4
Package selection 4 4 4
Change management 4 4
Stakeholders 4 4
Discussion and concluding comments
The authors have shown similarities between the charac-
teristics of the case study and previously published
research on organisational transformation and change.
These characteristics were found to be indicative of busi-
ness failure. Furthermore, the authors proposed a frame-
work for assessing the qualitative aspects of information
system investments in this context.
An evaluative model for assessing the fit of people,
process and technology factors was proposed (the ‘5M
model’). The case study clearly identified human and
organisational issues as essential factors for ensuring the
successful integration of an information system. The
findings from the case study indicate that the evaluation
process for implementing a manufacturing information
system was not financial in nature; rather, the decision
to invest was made as an ‘act of faith’, although calling
it a strategic decision may have been more comforting
for management.
The reason for Company V’s ad hoc approach to
investment evaluation was because many of the benefits
resulting from the information system were considered
intangible and non-financial, and as a result, could not be
accommodated within traditional appraisal frameworks.
This was further complicated by the new and inexperi-
enced management team, and their lack of knowledge of
hybrid appraisal methods.
However, it is this misguided need by many compa-
nies to analyse all investment proposals in financial
terms, which presents many problems during project
evaluation.
Hence, in broader terms, with management under
increasing pressure to produce financial savings, much
care needs to be taken to ensure that those projects with
long-term strategic focuses are not excluded on the basis
of their intangible and non-financial benefits.
The significance of human and organisational factors
has been raised within this paper, with their inclusion
essential within any robust evaluation process. This is
exemplified by the case study, as during the adoption of
vendor MRPII modules, no account of ‘soft’ cost factors
(human and organisational) was made. As a result, the
system was deemed a failure as it was substantially over
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Table 4 Learning issues associated with transforming manufacturing IS failure into success
Key performance indicators (KPIs) Critical success factors (CSFs)
I Organisational culture and infrastructure technology facilitates I Support from management through agile decision
synergy between people, processes and technology—the making.
proposed ‘5M model’.
I IT/IS evaluation against qualitative factors, should be part of I An understanding and successful business fit of the
the change management philosophy in manufacturing new technology.
organisations: management and workforce buy-in, will
underpin, initiate and maintain enterprise growth as a result.
I Business transformation (and hence implementation success), I Communication, involvement and development through
should be through a flexible realisation of the organisation’s all levels of the organisation.
growth (ie a lifecycle model should exist to model the
organisation’s learning and change processes).
budget, and not accepted by its stakeholders. However,
in later addressing human and organisational issues, the
company set about developing a bespoke solution, which
is considered to have resulted in the successful ‘roll out’
of a bespoke solution, based upon addressing both
human-organisational and technological issues.
Hence, it would appear that there are three key areas
that can be identified as providing enterprises with the
capacity to transform themselves from failure to success,
along with the respective critical success factors, as
shown in Table 4.
These factors attempt to outline, how organisational
structures, culture and development should be implicitly
linked with the adoption and implementation of any infor-
mation systems solution. The case study clearly highlights
that business transformation is heavily reliant upon both
change management and organisational learning.
Indeed, it has been shown that both strategic (external)
and operational (internal) CSFs, are reliant upon people
and associated Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to
measure the success of business decisions. Such organis-
ations are characterised by their capability to change
themselves, by seizing opportunities to grow, reacting to
threats and utilising knowledge structures appropriately.
This approaches the concept of an agile organisation,
which most manufacturing organisations have been
attempting to aspire to in recent years.
The transformation of the case study’s information
system was considered to be due to the realisation of
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